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This paper examines broadly the intergovernmental 
structure in the Middle East and North Africa region, 
which has one of the most centralized government 
structures in the world.  The authors address the reasons 
behind this centralized structure by looking first at 
the history behind the tax systems of the region. They 
review the Ottoman taxation system, which has been 
predominantly influential as a model, and discuss its 
impact on current government structure. They also 
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discuss the current intergovernmental structure by 
examining the type and degree of decentralization in 
five countries representative of the region: Egypt, Iran, 
West Bank/Gaza, Tunisia, and Yemen. Cross-country 
regression analysis using panel data for a broader set of 
countries leads to better understanding of the factors 
behind heavy centralization in the region. The findings 
show that external conflicts constitute a major roadblock 
to decentralization in the region.   
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There have been significant decentralization efforts in developing countries in 
recent decades. These efforts led to an extensive literature on the causes and 
consequences of both centralization and decentralization. In this paper, we examine 
decentralization and intergovernmental relations in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA), a region that has lagged behind other developing regions in decentralization. 
The MENA region has unique socio-economic and political characteristics. First, 
there is economic dependency on oil revenues particularly in Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries.  Second, the MENA region has one of the highest population growth 
rates in the world. This demographic explosion has led to young population structures 
throughout the region. Third, the region has been impacted by both internal and external 
conflicts that have affected economic performance of the countries.   
Despite these good reasons to study government structure in the MENA, there is 
surprisingly sparse literature on the region. While recent studies followed a comparative 
perspective and showed similarities and differences between the decentralization efforts 
in a variety of developing countries, the MENA countries are left out of those 
comparisons (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). This is mainly due to lack of appropriate 
data and information on decentralization in the countries of the region. Our goal in this 
paper is to combine descriptive and empirical analyses to provide a comprehensive 
picture of decentralization and the reasons behind its slow progress. We also discuss 
some reform options. 
  2  The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we look at the history of 
decentralization and centralization in the region by examining the taxation system of the 
Ottoman Empire. We provide a comparative description of the intergovernmental 
structure in five MENA countries, Iran, Egypt, Tunisia, West Bank/Gaza and Yemen in 
Section 3. In Section 4 we explore the determinants of centralization and decentralization 
in the region in a regression analysis. We discuss the intergovernmental reform options in 
the final section. 
2. Centralization in the MENA Countries: A Historical Perspective 
MENA countries have relatively more centralized government structures 
compared to other developing countries. It is argued that many MENA countries have 
based their government organization on the administration structure of the Ottoman 
Empire. 
2.1. Ottoman Taxation System 
Overall, the Ottoman taxation was a centralized system of taxation. Lewis (1979) 
argues that Ottoman taxation included elements from Islamic taxation as well as from 
taxation law and practices of Roman, Byzantine, Mongolian, Turkish and pre-Islamic 
Persian civilizations. Cosgel (2005) examines the evolution of the tax system in the 
Ottoman Empire as a clash between competition and rigidity in institutions. For example 
he argues that while the Ottomans changed the tax system in the conquered lands to 
collect revenue in the most efficient way, they were faced with local institutional 
constraints. Hence, this explained the substantial regional variation in taxes throughout 
the empire. 
  3Lewis also asserts that Ottoman tax administration changed from a relatively 
decentralized system with strong center to a weaker but more centralized system. This 
change started around the end of the sixteenth century. There had been a consolidation of 
tax collection after the sixteenth century, particularly during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.
1  While many argue that this coincides with the stagnation and 
decline in the Empire, Barkey (2008) argues that this “adaptation was a sign of flexibility 
and pragmatism, not a sign of decline.”
2 In places such as Egypt more government 
centralization took place in accordance with heavier European influence (Hanna, 1995).  
In this centralization trend, we see a change from the Timar system (strong center with 
decentralized military expenditures) to Iltizam or Tax-farming system (weaker center 
with more centralization of military and more decentralization of other government 
services at the province level) towards the end of the sixteenth century. Timar is a land-
tenure system where the land was allocated to Sipahis (feudal cavalry) in return for 
military service in Ottoman provinces (Barkey, 1994: 36).
3 In the Iltizam system the state 
receives an initial monetary sum from private interests in return for rights to collect taxes 
(Barkey, 2008: 229). Some of the reasons for the system change from Timar to Iltizam 
were:  Sipahi cavalry becoming less important due to introduction of new war 
technologies, higher demand for full-time regular troops, changing patterns of trade, 
influx of Spanish silver from America and subsequent inflation leading to a sharp 
                                                 
1 See Barkey (2008, Part 2) and Inalcik (1977) for excellent accounts of transformation in the Ottoman 
administration towards centralization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
2 Barkey, Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective, 194. 
3 Inalcik (1994: 114-118) gives a detailed description of the Ottoman Timar system. As Inalcik notes, an 
interesting characteristic of the Ottoman Timar system was “the lack of inheritance rights on land and the 
frequent dismissal from timars” (Inalcik, 1994: 115). With the Timar system, Ottoman state was able to 
maintain provincial armies without direct centralized expenditures. In addition, the lack of inheritance 
rights prevented timar holders from forming land-based hereditary nobility that could become a threat to 
the central authority. 
  4decrease in real income (Lewis 1979, Barkey 1994). Barkey (1994) argues that Ottoman 
state was able to overcome (global) economic distress without any significant rebellions 
throughout the empire. She explains that this was mainly due to success of the state in 
aligning officials at different levels of government with the objectives and success of the 
central government. Similarly, Hess (1977) describes what can be called Ottoman central 
administration’s success in keeping the North African provinces of the empire in the 
midst of decentralization in the eighteenth century.  
There have been few sporadic efforts to change the centralized government 
structure in the Ottoman Empire.  For example, Saliba (1978) explains in detail efforts 
and achievements of Midhat Pasha to decentralize political and fiscal powers when he 
served as Governor of the Syrian province. Such efforts faced strong opposition from the 
central government in Istanbul and were mainly approached with suspicion as the Empire 
was experiencing significant loss of territories. Reform efforts during the Tanzimat or 
Reorganization period in the nineteenth century aimed at creating a more centralized 
government structure (Ortayli, 2006). This was thought to be a way to save the Empire 
from total collapse.  
McLure (2001) argues that tax assignment over different levels of government 
depends on history, and has been subject to change through economic evolution. Hence, 
he asserts there is no one-size-fits-all formula for tax assignment. Cosgel and Miceli 
(2005) examine the tax assignment in the Ottoman Empire in the mid-sixteenth century. 
They provide evidence that the tax assignment was done according to a transaction cost 
hypothesis rather than risk hypothesis. They classify taxes into categories of fixed and 
variable taxes.  Fixed taxes category includes personal taxes based on marital and 
  5economic status, input taxes based on production inputs such as land, trees and animals, 
and enterprise taxes.  These taxes are thought to be less risky due to absence of factors 
that would cause variation and they also have lower transaction costs. Variable taxes 
category includes trade taxes from market exchange of goods in towns and output taxes 
such as taxes on grains, legumes and fibers. These taxes are riskier due to high variability 
and also carry greater transaction costs for the same reason.  Using data from Ottoman 
tax registers (tahrir defterleri) the authors conduct an ordered probit analysis for the 
influences on tax assignments and find that the proportion of variable taxes are negatively 
associated with the higher levels of government lending support to the transaction cost 
hypothesis which asserts that variable taxes can be more efficiently collected at the local 
level due to lower transaction costs. The key underlying assumption here is that 
transaction costs are higher for higher levels of government.  The authors conclude that 
transaction costs were more important in tax assignment in the Ottoman Empire. 
However, they do not model fixed taxes specifically. 
In summary, we see that the taxation system was not as centralized in the early 
period (until the end of the sixteenth century) of the Ottoman Empire as it was in the later 
period. Centralization gained momentum particularly during the Tanzimat 
(Reorganization) period in the nineteenth century when the empire was declining rapidly 
and consolidation of power at the center was seen as a solution to prevent total collapse. 
Centralization that started in the sixteenth century is, by no means, unique to the Ottoman 
Empire. In fact, Europe started its transformation from small, decentralized city-states to 
large and centralized territorial states at the end of the fifteenth century.
4 It was also 
                                                 
4 Alesina and Spolaore (2003) note that French invasion of Italy in 1494 marks the beginning of the period 
of absolutism in Europe. They argue that main reasons behind the centralization trend were the need for 
  6argued that European influence in the Middle East and North Africa fueled more 
government centralization (Hanna, 1995). Aside from few courageous attempts at 
decentralization, the region inherited a heavily centralized system of taxation and public 
administration from the Ottoman Empire and other European States. 
3. Comparison of Intergovernmental Structure in Selected MENA Countries 
In this section, we examine the intergovernmental structure in a selected number 
of MENA countries to demonstrate the centralized features of local government systems 
in the region. Our selection includes five countries representing both Maghreb and 
Mashreq regions. These are Egypt, Iran, Tunisia, West Bank/Gaza and Yemen. The 
central government in these countries is the senior partner in the intergovernmental 
relationship. The share of subnational expenditures in GDP is very low compared to 
OECD average of 17 percent
5 (see Table 1). In many countries in the MENA region, 
such as Yemen and Iran, a large share of the expenditures is disbursed through 
subnational governments that act as agents of central government ministries and 
departments. In these countries locally elected representatives have little decision-making 
power over expenditures. 
                                                                                                                                                
3.1. Deconcentration and Decentralization in MENA 
Overall, local government systems in the MENA region can be characterized as a 
form of deconcentration rather than one of devolved local self-government. In general, 
the public administration system is highly centralized, equipped with an elaborate system 
of deconcentrated field offices of line agencies. Decisions for the most part, especially 
 
institutions and larger domestic markets caused by growing economies in Europe, and rising costs of war 
and public administration. 
5 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDSRE/Resources/WBFDISummaryNote17Aug2004.doc 
  7service delivery decisions, are made by the central government and the role of 
subnational authorities is largely confined to carrying these out.  
In the region, the general trend is to have two distinct types of local government 
units: deconcentrated and decentralized (municipal) units (See Table 2). The operations 
of these two types of local governments are subject to totally different rules. In all 
countries, the deconcentrated units of the central government provide a big chunk of 
public services, including health and education, under strict guidance of the central 
government. Whereas, decentralized units (generally municipalities) perform limited 
number of functions such as street paving and maintenance, construction of local roads, 
street lighting, garbage collection, library and park services, and issuing permits for 
constructions. 
Table 2 shows that our five selection countries differ in their deconcentrated 
systems. While West Bank/Gaza and Tunisia have only provincial or governorate level 
governments, Iran, Yemen and Egypt have a variety of sub-provincial level governments. 
In all five countries, the central government and/or the President appoint the heads of 
provincial governments.  On the other hand, elected officials in all of them, except Egypt, 
run municipalities. In Iran, representation of people is partial and indirect. First, there is 
involvement of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) in both urban and rural municipalities. 
Second, people elect city or village councils that in turn appoint mayors jointly with the 
MOI. 
3.2. Expenditure Assignment 
Although the degree of centralization differs among MENA countries, they 
generally have heavily centralized expenditure and revenue systems. In almost all 
  8countries in the MENA region the assignment of expenditure responsibilities between 
central and local governments does not conform to generally accepted principles for 
setting the right incentives for efficient and equitable delivery of public services. In 
contrast, intergovernmental expenditure responsibilities have been assigned largely 
according to static bureaucratic and administrative considerations.  
In the region, subnational deconcentrated governments have a very limited 
number of “own” responsibilities. Most of the local expenditure responsibilities can be 
classified as “delegated” expenditures as opposed to “own” expenditure responsibilities.
6 
Central government ministries make decisions on most services that are traditionally 
provided by local governments in other countries (See Table 3).  
Table 3 shows the expenditure assignments in five MENA countries and also 
includes the worldwide practice. Expenditure assignments are indicated as central 
government (C), provincial government (P), and municipal government (M). 
Assignments are shown for Social Services, Transportation, Utility Services and Other 
Services, and are also broken down by Macro Policy and Oversight, Financing, and 
Provision.  MENA countries have significantly more centralized expenditure functions 
compared to the worldwide practice. To compare MENA countries among themselves, 
we assigned points to central, provincial and municipal government involvement in 
expenditures. Accordingly, we assigned 1 point to C, 2 points to P and 3 points to M.
7 
Total expenditure assignment scores and average scores are listed in Table 4. The average 
                                                 
6 Delegated responsibilities are those transferred to the deconcentrated branch units of the central 
government for delivery of services while the actual decisions on budgeting and financing are carried out at 
the central level. Some of the delegated responsibilities, such as primary education, health, and public 
security have high local public good characteristics and in many countries are not delivered by locally 
elected governments. 
7 In addition we assigned 1.5 points to C, P; 2.5 points to P, M and 2 points to C, P, M.  We gave 1 instead 
of 0 to central government assignments since the worldwide practice shows that some central government 
involvement is probably desirable to facilitate decentralization. 
  9scores for countries across government services and government involvement show that 
West Bank/Gaza has the most decentralized expenditure system among the group 
followed, in order, by Egypt, Iran, Tunisia and Yemen. 
3.3. Revenue Assignment 
Table 5 shows revenue assignment characteristics in the region. West Bank/Gaza 
is the only country with a truly decentralized revenue system. However, municipal 
revenue autonomy in West Bank and Gaza is not something granted by the laws. Due to 
the circumstances, municipalities invent their own ways of raising revenues and they 
often find ways of rationalizing such practices (World Bank, 2006).  
Other than West Bank/Gaza, all other countries in the region have largely an ad-
hoc local revenue system. The only exception might be property tax system in Iran. We 
see a glimpse of autonomy in land-based taxation in Iran. 
3.4. Intergovernmental Transfer Characteristics 
Table 6 shows that allocation rules for transfers to local governments are also 
mainly ad-hoc, except in Tunisia and West Bank/Gaza. In both countries, the transfer 
system is based on a formula. In West Bank and Gaza municipalities have been 
historically less dependent on central government transfers compared to other countries 
in the region. Both due to historical reasons and current political and security problems, 
West Bank and Gaza municipalities rely little on central government transfers in 
providing services. In fact, this situation has not been affected significantly by the 
Intifada period, as there is no difference today in the amount of central government 
  10transfers as a share of total local revenues, which remains constant at about 5 percent
8 
(World Bank, 2006). 
3.5. Discussion 
  In this section, we presented an overview of the deconcentration and 
decentralization systems in selected MENA countries and compared these countries in 
terms of three important aspect of decentralization: expenditure assignment, revenue 
assignment and intergovernmental transfers. We also compared these countries to the 
worldwide practice in expenditure assignments. First, we see a good potential for a rich 
deconcentrated and decentralized government structure in MENA countries. Most of the 
countries analyzed have a good number of lower tier governments such as governorates, 
districts and a variety of municipalities (e.g. 1000 urban municipalities and 68,000 rural 
municipalities in Iran). Second, MENA countries are significantly behind the worldwide 
practice in decentralization regarding expenditure assignments. We see in Table 4 that 
this is particularly true in social services, which is one of the most important government 
expenditures that directly affect the welfare of residents. Third, West Bank/Gaza seems to 
have the greatest degree of decentralization from the perspective of both expenditure and 
revenue assignments. Among the countries analyzed, West Bank/Gaza gives the greatest 
autonomy to its local governments. While this highlights West Bank/Gaza as an 
interesting case to consider for other countries in the region, one should approach the 
decentralization efforts cautiously as the observed decentralization seems to spring from 
special political and security circumstances of that country. Finally, there is need for 
improvement in intergovernmental relations in MENA countries. Intergovernmental 
transfer rules are largely ad-hoc. Our comparative analysis leads us to conclude that 
                                                 
8 This is the average figure for West Bank and Gaza municipalities in the Intifada period.
  
  11MENA countries have highly centralized government fiscal structures. This is despite our 
observation that there is a potentially rich deconcentrated and decentralized government 
systems. In the next section, we will examine the reasons behind this heavy centralization 
using different regression analyses. 
4. Determinants of Centralization and Decentralization 
4.1. Measurement Issues and Review of the Literature 
Decentralization is difficult to measure. Despite the popularity of decentralization 
as a research topic in recent literature, there are serious problems with the measurement 
of decentralization. Ebel and Yilmaz (2003) note that this is mainly due to data 
imperfections, particularly in the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS).  Problems 
with data availability and quality get worse in the case of the MENA countries.  Hence an 
empirical investigation of decentralization in the MENA region is difficult due to 
aforementioned data problems. As so many other studies did before us, we started with 
data from the GFS. We have realized however that data on conventional fiscal 
decentralization measures such as share of local governments in total government 
expenditures or revenues are simply nonexistent. That left us with using data on total 
central government expenditures relative to an economic base such as gross domestic 
product (GDP). Thus, we first used total budgetary central government expenditures as 
share of GDP of the country.  While this measure captures mainly the size of the central 
government, it will also be closely related to the degree of delegation of central 
government powers to lower levels of government.  A reduction in the size of the central 
government could be one avenue for decentralization. Indeed, we get a negative 
correlation (-0.47) between the share of local government spending in GDP for the 
  12countries shown in the first column of Table 1 and the average share of central 
government expenditures from our panel dataset. In the absence of better government 
finance data on fiscal decentralization, we use central government expenditures to get a 
feel for the weight of central government in economic activity. 
We also use a non-financial measure of decentralization, which is derived from 
the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (DPI). This decentralization indicator 
is created by taking the sum of three other indicator variables from DPI for local elections 
in municipal governments (Muni), local elections in state/province governments (State) 
and authority over taxing, spending or legislating in state/provinces (Author).
9 Hence, 
higher numbers in our decentralization indicator mean greater degree of decentralization. 
There is considerable literature on the effects of fiscal decentralization on 
economic growth. Determinants of fiscal decentralization received less attention.  Two 
recent papers provide theory and empirical evidence on the determinants of the 
decentralization process in a wide variety of countries. Panizza (1999) builds on the work 
by Alesina and Spolaore (1997) on the number and size of nations by introducing 
different levels of government.  Panizza’s theoretical model shows negative correlations 
between fiscal centralization and country size, income per capita, taste differentiation and 
level of democracy. He finds empirical evidence supporting these theoretical correlations.  
Panizza also compares his results to two other cross-sectional or panel studies by Oates 
(1972) and Wallis and Oates (1988) and finds similarities particularly in regards to 
country size and income per capita.  Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) examine the 
determinants of fiscal decentralization using panel data on 48 countries over the period 
                                                 
9 Muni, State and Author are the names used in DPI under the sub-heading “Federalism.” See Beck et al. 
(2001) and Keefer (2007) for detailed descriptions of these variables. Higher numbers indicate greater 
degree of federalism, and thus decentralization of central government authority. 
  131960 to 1995. They show that the Middle East and North Africa region has the highest 
share of central government and the lowest federalism index.
10  They also show that the 
Middle East and North Africa lags behind all other regions in the democracy index. 
Arzaghi and Henderson follow Panizza’s approach to model decentralization first and 
then empirically test hypotheses derived from the theoretical model.  Their empirical 
findings mainly confirm previous findings on the determinants of decentralization (or 
centralization). They find that past colonial experience and initial constitutional 
provisions matter in the decentralization process. 
4.2. Empirical Analysis 
We are using an unbalanced panel for fourteen countries with a study period 
broadly from 1975 to 2004.
11  As mentioned above, we are examining centralization and 
decentralization in MENA in two parts. In the first set of regressions we use total 
budgetary central government expenditures as share of GDP as our dependent variable, 
which we see as a rough indicator of centralization. To address the shortcomings of this 
variable as a measure of centralization (or decentralization), we run a second set of 
regressions with a decentralization indicator derived from DPI as the dependent variable. 
Given our key dependent variable measuring degrees of decentralization, which is 
thus inherently ordered, our second set of regressions are based on the probabilistic 
ordinal dependent variable regression model of the Logit type 
() () ( ) 1 , jj PY jX X X μβ μ β − ′ == Λ −− Λ − ′
                                                
  
 
10 Their evidence on MENA is based on only few countries in the region due to problems with available 
data on fiscal decentralization. 
11 These fourteen countries are Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, 
Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. We had to reduce our sample to nine countries in the 
regressions with central government expenditures due to lack of government expenditure data for Djibouti, 
Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. 
  14where  ( X j Y P = )  is the probability of observing  { } J j ,.., 0 ∈  outcome of the 
dependent variable Y conditional on the vector X of individual country characteristics, Λ 
is the standard logistic distribution function, and β  is the vector of regression 
coefficients to be estimated by the Maximum Likelihood method. Denoting 
* Y  the latent 
variable driving the observed outcomes of Y and  j μ  the  1 − J  cutoff points such that 
j j μ μ < −1 , the model assumes that  0 = Y  if Y ,  0
* μ < j Y =  if  , and 
 if  .  
j μ < j μ −1 Y <
*
J Y = μ
*
1 Y J < −
Our choice of explanatory variables is based mainly on the theoretical and 
empirical analyses by Oates (1972), Wallis and Oates (1988), Panizza (1999), and 
Arzaghi and Henderson (2005).  We use GDP per capita, Population and Land Area to 
capture the effects of the size of the economy and the size of the country. Oates (1972), 
Panizza (1999) and Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) all found that these are negatively 
correlated with centralization. If decentralization is a normal good, we would expect a 
negative relationship between income per capita and centralization (Panizza, 1999).   
Wallis and Oates (1988) argue that smaller states may benefit more from centralization as 
economies of scale may not be exhausted due to small population size at decentralized 
levels.  Wallis and Oates also argue that population concentration in urban areas increase 
the benefits from decentralization.  Hence, we would expect a negative relationship 
between urbanization and centralization. We use Share of Urban Population to find the 
effect of population concentrations. Both Panizza (1999) and Arzaghi and Henderson 
(2005) point to the importance of democracy and other institutional factors in 
decentralization. In Panizza’s model level of democracy is inversely related with the 
willingness of the central government to extract rent and ignore the preferences of the 
  15median voter, which imply a negative correlation between democracy and centralization. 
We use Democratic Environment and Quality of Governance as two types of institutional 
variables. These come from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) published by 
the PRS Group.
12 Democratic Environment is the average of the following political risk 
components law and order, democratic accountability, military in politics, and religion in 
politics.  Quality of Governance is the average of law and order, bureaucratic quality and 
corruption.
13  Finally, we add two other variables that were not specifically used by the 
literature mentioned above.  First, we have Trade Openness, traditionally defined as the 
ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP.  Rodrik (1998) argues that more open 
countries have larger governments to stabilize the economy against external shocks. To 
the extent that the stabilization role is undertaken by the central government we would 
expect a positive relationship between openness and centralization. The second variable 
we introduce is External Conflict.  This may be an important factor in centralization 
especially in the MENA region. Tosun and Sen (2007) show that the MENA countries 
have more major conflicts such as war, on average, than other developing countries. They 
find evidence of significant spatial spillovers from regional conflicts. Alesina and 
Spolaore (2003) present a model with conflict and size of nations. They show that 
external shocks give a strong incentive to form larger jurisdictions. We draw a parallel 
and further argue that external shocks may legitimize greater central government budgets 
since national defense is a function of government undertaken by the central government. 
Alesina and Spolaore also address the interaction between democratization and conflicts, 
                                                 
12 Note that higher risk points correspond to an improvement in the institutional variable. 
13 This was recently used as a measure of governance quality by Knack (2001).  Components of these 
institutional variables, particularly corruption in government, were used in many other studies including 
Tanzi and Davoodi (2000), Mauro (1996) and Knack and Keefer (1995). 
  16showing that democratization becomes a less important factor in reducing the size of 
countries when there are major conflicts. We also examine how the impact of 
democratization changes when external conflict is introduced into the empirical analysis. 
Data on External Conflict also comes from the ICRG dataset. We adjusted this variable, 
however, to have higher points representing worsening of conflicts.
14 Finally, we use 
GCC as a dummy variable for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to control 
for the possible impact of heavy dependence on oil on the government structure of these 
countries.
15  
4.3. Empirical Results 
We provide the summary statistics on the variables described above in Table 7.  
We start with the first set of regression results in Table 8. In addition to the explanatory 
variables explained above, we also include country fixed effects in our Table 8 
regressions. Hence, country characteristics such as land area, being an oil producer, and 
all time invariant institutional factors are captured by the fixed effects estimation. We 
also see that serial correlation of errors could be a serious problem in our data. We run 
AR(1) fixed effects regressions to correct for the serial correlation problem.   
We find that the coefficients of the size variables, GDP per capita and Population 
have the expected negative sign but not statistically significant in all four regressions. 
The coefficient of the Share of Urban Population is positive, significant and robust 
across all regressions. This finding is counter to the argument by Wallis and Oates 
(1988). We see in columns (1) and (2) that both institutional variables have the expected 
                                                 
14 We have also tried with a variable on internal conflicts but that didn’t turn out be a significant factor in 
any of the regressions. 
15 We removed GCC and Land Area from the first set of regressions as these cause perfect multicollinearity 
in the fixed effects regressions. 
  17negative sign and statistically significant with lower significance for the Quality of 
Governance. Column (3) shows that External Conflict has a significant positive effect on 
centralization, which is also expected as we argued above in section 4.2.  When we 
include both institutional variables and external conflict in the same regression in column 
(4), we see that External Conflict still has a positive and significant effect while 
democratic environment loses its significance and the coefficient of quality of 
governance turns positive.  Hence, external conflict is the only robust factor among the 
institutional and conflict variables. Similar to the implications of the theoretical model of 
Alesina and Spolaore (2003), we find that Democratic Environment loses its importance 
when External Conflict is added to the analysis. Finally, Trade Openness is significant 
only in regressions (3) and (4). With a positive and significant coefficient, results for 
openness in columns (3) and (4) support Rodrik’s argument. 
While results in Table 8 are interesting, these regressions are open to the criticism 
that the dependent variable, central government expenditure as share of GDP, may just be 
capturing the size of central government instead of centralization in the government 
sector. To address this, we ran a second set of regressions with a decentralization 
indicator derived from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (DPI). Since 
our new dependent variable is an indicator variable where higher numbers indicate 
greater decentralization, ordered logit regressions are run as described in section 4.2. 
Results from those regressions are shown in Table 9. We get similar results to the ones in 
Table 8. We find that the size variables, GDP per capita and Population have the 
expected positive sign and they are statistically significant in most of the regressions. The 
coefficient of the Share of Urban Population is negative and significant in all regressions, 
  18which is counter to the argument that urbanization triggers decentralization. We now get 
conflicting results from our institution variables in columns (1) and (2). While Quality of 
Governance has the expected positive sign, it is not statistically significant. What is 
surprising is that Democratic Environment has a negative sign indicating a negative effect 
on decentralization. While this may seem puzzling, it may be pointing to a possible 
nonlinear relationship between democratization and decentralization. It may be that it is 
too early to see the decentralization outcome in MENA countries during the initial phase 
of democratization. Results in column (3) shows that External Conflict still has the 
expected negative effect on decentralization (or positive effect on centralization).  When 
we again include both institutional variables and External Conflict in the same regression 
in column (4), we see that External Conflict still has a negative and significant effect on 
decentralization.  Hence, we repeat that External Conflict is the only robust factor among 
the institutional and conflict variables. Finally, we see that GCC countries have 
significantly lower level of decentralization compared to other MENA countries and 
trade openness also has a positive and significant association with decentralization. 
In summary, our main findings show that improvements in the institutional 
variables have some negative effect on the centralization but these do not seem to be as 
important as the strong negative (positive) decentralization (centralization) effect of 
external conflicts. When we examine the marginal effect from external conflict in the 
ordered logit regression in column (4) of Table 9, we compute that every one degree 
improvement in external conflict increases the probability of moving from a zero score in 
decentralization to a score of one by about 4%. This may look small but considering that 
MENA countries, on average, had an external conflict score of 10 out of a maximum of 
  1912 in 2003, they have a lot of room for improvement in external conflicts. For example, if 
MENA countries manage to move to a zero score on external conflicts, which means no 
external conflicts, this would increase the same probability by 40%. 
5. Intergovernmental Reform Options and Conclusions 
Our empirical analysis gives us interesting insights into determinants of the 
central government’s role in the economy. The most striking result is the significant role 
of external conflicts in centralization (or decentralization). It seems external conflicts set 
a major obstacle in decentralization. This would lend itself to a recommendation that 
countries in the region and other related countries should work together to remove this 
obstacle. As Tosun and Sen (2007) suggest regional conflict prevention is an 
international public good and a collective provision of this public good would ease the 
burden on central governments of individual countries. This will, in turn, release 
resources from the grasp of central governments that are currently charged wholly with 
the provision of this public good and make it available to the local governments.  
A precondition for transferring additional resources to local governments is fixing 
intergovernmental fiscal systems. The most striking feature of the public management 
system in the MENA region is the degree of centralization. All countries in the region 
have a highly centralized administrative structure with very limited decision-making 
power assigned to local governments. For a variety of reasons (e.g., tradition, history, 
culture), responsibilities assigned to local governments have not been as extensive as 
those in many other parts of the world. In their efforts to reform local government sector, 
governments should recognize that decentralization requires sharing of fiscal roles and 
responsibilities between central and local governments accompanied by a robust capacity 
  20to deliver services both centrally and locally. The challenge is to determine how to sort-
out the responsibilities and financing among different types of local governments. It is 
important for the decision makers in the region that decentralization reforms may be 
asymmetric. They can set criteria to classify local governments into different categories 
that have asymmetric taxing and spending responsibilities and borrowing privileges. This 
would give impetus to decentralization reform process by which regional governments 
(governorates) and local governments might be empowered with increased autonomy in 
expenditure and revenue decisions. However, they should keep in mind that there is a 
need for systematically reviewing legal and regulatory standards for “sorting out” rules 
and responsibilities among different types and levels of governments. 
Decentralization is a dynamic process where the intergovernmental relations 
system needs constant adjustments. The governments in the region should consider 
establishing a mechanism to (a) improve the design and gauge the direction, pace, and 
extent of decentralization, and (b) disseminate information, provide training and directly 
engage municipal governments in the decentralization process.  
In the long run, the governments in the region need to devolve expenditure 
responsibilities further to local governments while making them fully accountable before 
their respective constituencies for policy results, in terms of their effectiveness and 
efficiency in delivering quality public services. To this end, they should consider 
strengthening local government accountability mechanisms by systemic collection, 
analysis, and dissemination of information about local fiscal performance and compliance 
with financial and policy goals. Such information is essential both to informed public 
  21participation through political process and to the monitoring of municipal performance by 
the central government.   
An important issue in the MENA region is to increase local public expenditure 
efficiency in areas of concurrent expenditure responsibilities and creating strong 
incentives (financial and legal) to promote cooperative arrangements among local 
governments for service delivery. In this context, outsourcing public service to the private 
sector as well as private sector participation in both financing and delivery of public 
services can be a way to improve overall efficiency of local government expenditures. 
In reforming local government systems the most challenging task for the 
governments in the region would be restructuring the overall revenue system in a manner 
that provides local governments “fiscal space” to strengthen own revenue and 
expenditure arrangements. The governments should first make sure that adequate steps 
are taken to establish accountability mechanisms, then boost revenue autonomy by giving 
local governments adequate decision-making powers on tax rates and the determination 
of some tax bases in order to improve budgetary predictability. They should gradually lift 
central government controls on local fees and taxes after making sure that local revenue 
mobilization is maintained.  
An important characteristic of intergovernmental fiscal systems in the region is 
the use of ad hoc transfers. The governments should study rationalizing the transfer 
system so as to make it more effective instrument for the implementation of policies of 
national interest at the local level and reduce horizontal fiscal disparities. This would 
include an examination of conditional and unconditional (e.g., equalization) transfer 
systems alike. They should established transparent rule-base transfer system with explicit 
  22formulas for equalization. They should explore ideas for a combination of unconditional 
and matching open-ended type of grants that would to force municipal governments to 
exploit their revenue bases. A related topic is to enforce hard budget constraints for local 
governments. Governments in the region should credibly commit to a hard budget 
constraint and avoid bailing out local governments that get into a financial mess. 
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 Table 1 Share of Local Government in GDP and in Total Government Expenditures  
Country (Year)  Percentage of GDP  Percentage of total public sector spending 
Egypt (2005/06)  4.6  15.6 
Iran (2004/05)  6.0  9.0 




Tunisia 4.3  12.1 
Source: Authors’ compilation.
  27Table 2: Deconcentration and Decentralization Systems in MENA Countries 
 Iran  Yemen  Egypt  West  Bank/Gaza  Tunisia 
Central Government 
Ministry  
Ministry of Interior (MoI)  Ministry of Local Administration 
(MoLA) 
Ministry of Local Development (MoLD)  Ministry of Local 
Government (MoLG) 
Ministry of Interior 




30 provinces (Ostan) 
318 districts (Shahrestan) 
854 rural counties (Bakhsh) 
22 governorates 
332 districts  
26 governorates 
180 districts (markaz) 
213 cities (madina) 
74 districts (hay) 
1164 rural villages (qariya) 
 
16 governorates  24 Governorates 
 
Appointed by  Provincial governor (Ostandar) is 
appointed by the President 
District Governor (Farmandar) is 
appointed by MoI 
Rural county administrator 
(Bakhshdar) is appointed by the 
Ostandar 
Governor is appointed by the 
President 
District governor is appointed by 
the Prime Minister 
Governor is appointed by the President 
Chief of markaz is appointed by the 
Prime Minister 
City and district chiefs are appointed 
by the minister of MoLD 
Village chief is appointed by the 
governor 
Governor is appointed by 
the President. 
Governor is appointed by the 
central government 
Council  Provincial Planning and Development 
Council (Chair: Ostandar; Line Ministry 
reps)  
District Planning Committee (Chair: 
Farmandar; Line Ministry reps)  
Governorate council directly 
elected by people 
District council directly elected by 
people 
There are two councils at each local 
government level: 
Elected People’s Council and centrally 
appointed local Executive Council. 
Executive council is composed of 
representatives of central government 
ministries and departments.  
  Regional assembly is made up 
members of the Parliament of the 
region, municipal mayors and 




More than 1000 municipalities (Shahr)  
More than 68,000 rural municipalities 
(Deh/Roosta) 
N/A N/A  119  municipalities 
251 village councils 
49 joint service councils  
262 municipalities 
Elected by  Mayor of an urban municipality 
(Shahrdar) is jointly appointed by the 
MoI and City Council, which is directly 
elected by people. 
Mayor of a rural municipality (Dehyar) 
is jointly appointed by the MoI and 
Village Council, which is directly 
elected by people. 
N/A  N/A  Municipal mayor and 
council members are 
directly elected by people. 
Village councils and joint 
services committees are 
appointed by the MoLG. 
Municipalities are governed by an 
elected municipal council that 
elects its mayor within its ranks. 
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  Macro Policy/Oversight  Financing  Provision 
Function  Iran Yemen  Egypt  WBG  Tunisia  Worldwide  Iran Yemen  Egypt  WBG  Tunisia  Worldwide  Iran Yemen  Egypt  WBG  Tunisia  Worldwide 
Social Services
c 
Social Welfare  C C C C C  C  C C C C C  C  C C C C C  C,P,M 
Hospitals  C C C C C  C  C C C C C  C,P,M  C C,P C  C  P C,P,M 
Public Health  C C C C C C,P C C C C C  C,P,M  C  C,P  C C C  C,P,M 
Universities  C C C C C C,P C C C C C  C,P,M  C C C C P  C,P,M 
Secondary 
Education 
C C C C C C,P C C C C C  C,P,M  C C C C P  C,P,M 
Primary 
Education 
C C C C C C,P C C C C C  C,P,M  C C C C P  C,P,M 





C,P,M C,P  C,P C,P,M  C  C,P,M C,P,M C,P C,P,M  C,P,M  C,P C,P,M  C,P,M  C,P,M C,P C,P,M C,P  C,P,M 
Railroads  C C C N/A C  C,P  C  C C  N/A  C C,P C  C C  N/A  C C,P 





C  C  N/A  C 
C  C  C C  N/A  C  C  C  C C  N/A  C  C 
Urban 
Highways 
C,P,M C,P  C,P C,P,M C,P  C,P,M C,P,M  C,P C,P,M  C,P,M C,P  C,P,M C,P,M  C,P,M C,P C,P,M C,P  C,P,M 
Interurban 
Highways 
C C,P  C,P C,P,M C,P  C,P  C  C,P C,P  C,P,M  C,P  C,P  C  C,P,M C,P C,P,M C,P  C,P 
Utility Services
e 
Electricity  C C C C C  C,P,M  C  C C M C  C,P,M  C  C C C C  C,P,M 
Waste 
Collection 
M P M M M  M  M  P M M M  M  M  P M M M  M 
Water and 
Sewerage 
P,M C,P P,M M C,P  M  P,M  C,P P,M  M  C,P  M  P,M  C,P P,M  M  C,P  M 
Other Services
f 
Fire Protection  C C,P M C,P,M C  M  C  C,P M  C,P,M  C  M  C  C,P M  C,P,M  C  M 
Heating  C N/A  N/A N/A N/A  M  C  N/A N/A N/A N/A  M  C  N/A N/A N/A N/A  M 
Irrigation  C C,P  C,P C,P C,P  M  C  C,P C,P C,P C,P  M  C  C,P C,P C,P C,P  M 
Police  C C C C C  C,P,M  C  C C C C  C,P,M  C  C C C C  C,P,M 
C: Central Government   P: Provincial Government   M: Municipal Government   N/A: Not applicable 
c These services are national in scope, the central government has a role in correcting fiscal inefficiencies and regional inequalities, it should also provide some financing to cover spillovers.  
d The overriding concern is the efficient provision of services. If the benefits accrue to local jurisdictions it should be financed by local residents. If the benefits of the service spillovers to other 
jurisdictions, the service is national in scope and the cost of service should be realized by nonresidents as well. 
e These services are local in scope; if the services are financed by national revenues, nonresidents bear the cost of services. In that case, inefficient allocation of resources is a major concern. However, 
preservation of internal common market might be an area of concern; central government might have a role in regulatory function to ensure efficiency and equitable provision of some of these services. 
f The primary beneficiaries of these services are local residents and they are most efficiently provided by local governments. 
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Table 4: Expenditure Assignment Scores* 







Services Average  Score** 
Iran 7  8  6.5  4  1.28 
Yemen 7  7.5  4.5  4  1.21 
Egypt 7  7.5  6.5  5.5  1.39 
West Bank/Gaza  7  6  7  4.5  1.53 
Tunisia 7  7  5.5  3.5  1.21 
Worldwide Practice  9.5  9.5  8  11  1.90 
        







Services  Average Score** 
Iran 7  8  6.5  4  1.28 
Yemen 7  7.5  4.5  4  1.21 
Egypt 7  8.5  6.5  5.5  1.45 
West Bank/Gaza  7  6  9  4.5  1.66 
Tunisia 7  7.5  5.5  3.5  1.24 
Worldwide Practice  13  9.5  8  11  2.08 
        







Services Average  Score** 
Iran 7  8  6.5  4  1.28 
Yemen 8  9  4.5  4  1.34 
Egypt 7  7.5  6.5  5.5  1.39 
West Bank/Gaza  7  6  7  4.5  1.53 
Tunisia 11  7.5  5.5  3.5  1.45 
Worldwide Practice  14  9.5  8  11  2.13 
Source: Computed by the authors. 
* Expenditure assignment scores are determined as follows: 
Central Government (C) = 1 point 
Provincial Government (P) = 2 points 
Municipal Government (M) = 3 points 
C, P = 1.5 points 
P,M = 2.5 points 
C,P,M = 2 points 
 
** Average score is calculated by dividing the sum of total scores for each country in the table by the total 










  30Table 5: Revenue Assignment in MENA countries 
Country Revenue  Assignment 
Egypt  There is a national tax sharing system combined with local tax and fee surcharges. Rates are set nationally 
and the central government collects a portion (25-50%) of local taxes into special national funds.  Popular 
participation (down-payments of citizens) is the most important local revenue under the discretion of local 
governments. 
Iran  All local levies are required to be consistent with the government’s annual budget and the National Five 
Year Development Plans and to be in line with the capacity to pay as determined by the Ministry of Interior 
(ceiling for local tax/local income ratio).  With adoption of the Law on Tax Amalgamation (2003) revenue 
collection has been effectively re-centralizes and almost all taxes are collected by the central government. 
One of the main locally collected fees is the land use change and density increase tax. 
Tunisia  LGs can set and administer local taxes on developed real-estates, but this right is rarely exercised. Other 
taxes, fees, and charges are introduced by central government decrees and managed by central agencies.   
WBG  Of all the MNA-8 countries the WBG regulatory framework provides the greatest autonomy to the LGs.  
While LGs have a right to set taxes or create new ones, they can do so through initiating amendments to the 
tax law.  Many taxes and fees are collected and administered locally by LGs. 
Yemen  Central government sets both tax rates and base, LGs can make proposals for taxes and fees. Apart from the 
religion tax (‘zakat’) most taxes are not collected in many districts particularly in rural areas. 
 
Table 6: Transfer Characteristics and Allocation Rules in MENA Countries 
  Transfer Characteristics  Source  Allocation Rules 
Egypt  General development grants: 
mutual plus earmarked (service 
& development, land, housing, 
cleanliness, road). 
National budget.  No rule-based allocation nor 
formula. Discretionary grants and 
donations. 
Iran  Transfers to urban LGs appear to 
be negligible, particularly, in the 
larger cities. 





No formula. Allocation rules 
decided annually by the Parliament. 
Tunisia  Earmarked: operating grants 
through LG Common Fund 
(FCCL), development grants 
managed by Fund for Loan and 
Support for LG (CPSCL); sector 
based transfers; Regional 
Development transfers. 
National budget.  Formula based – 10% flat rate, 45%  
size of LG, 45% according to 
average property tax. 
WBG  Current transfers and grants for 
transport fees are not earmarked. 
Discretionary/emergency 
transfers are channeled to 
specific projects.  
Transport fees and a separate 
account assigned for 
discretionary/emergency 
transfers. 
A formula for the pool and 
distribution of transport fees exists 
on paper (1997 Local Government 
Law). Yet, the formula is only 
partially applied. 
Discretionary/emergency transfers 
are ad hoc. 
Yemen  30% of grants from extra-
budgetary funds that are 
earmarked, others are not. 
Shared revenues from 28 taxes, 
mainly – Zakat. 
No formula, but Council of 
Ministers uses non-binding 
guidelines – population density, 
financing gap, degree of 




  31 Table 7. Summary Statistics for the Regression Analysis on the Determinants of 
Centralization in MENA Countries         










       
Total central 
government spending 
(%  GDP)  206  35.467 15.958 16.225 211.182 
       
Decentralization 289  0.761 1.281 0  4 
       
GDP per capita 
(constant  $)  356  4,732.248 5,354.927 443.060  27,114 
       
Population  417  13,900,000 18,000,000 224,000  72,600,000 
       
Share of Urban 
Population  420  64.101 20.506 14.800 98.280 
       
Trade  Openness  361  82.507 36.579 13.772 251.140 
       
Land Area (square km)  420  582,721.3  690,737.2  690  2,000,000 
       
GCC  420  0.286 0.452 0  1 
       
Democratic 
Environment  253  3.168 0.795 0.750 4.750 
       
Quality  of  Governance  253  2.790 0.678 0.667 4.333 
       
External  Conflict  253  3.803 2.923 0  12 
       
   
 
  32Table 8. Determinants of Central Government Expenditure in MENA Countries   
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
















     





















     










     















  -0.065 
(0.046) 







     
External 
Conflict 




     
Constant -0.028  0.063  0.038  -0.021 
 (0.222)  (0.244)  (0.195)  (0.246) 
     
Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Rho (AR1)  0.452  0.417  0.522  0.365 
R
2 (within)  0.64  0.60  0.68  0.65 
Observations 125  125  125  125 
Number of 
panels 
9 9 9 9 
Standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         
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Table 9. Determinants of Decentralization in MENA Countries        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Decentralization Decentralization Decentralization Decentralization
      
Log of Land area  -0.113  -0.047  -0.031  0.046 
  (0.236) (0.237) (0.210) (0.214) 
      
Log of GDP per capita  4.384  4.788  4.357  4.666 
  (1.135)*** (1.183)*** (1.100)*** (1.151)*** 
      
Log of Population  1.577  1.352  1.145  0.978 
 (0.723)**  (0.722)*  (0.674)*  (0.667) 
      
Log of Share of Urban Pop.  -4.749  -5.724  -4.793  -5.373 
  (1.563)*** (1.865)*** (1.621)*** (1.742)*** 
      
Log of Trade openness  6.922  6.549  5.995  6.361 
  (1.645)*** (1.498)*** (1.461)*** (1.477)*** 
      
GCC  -8.065 -8.790 -8.220 -9.104 
  (1.887)*** (1.903)*** (1.789)*** (1.967)*** 
      
Democratic Environment  -0.184      -0.690 
 (0.379)      (0.336)** 
      
Quality of Governance    0.570    0.296 
   (0.417)   (0.490) 
      
External Conflict      -0.196  -0.260 
     (0.092)**  (0.127)** 
      
Fixed  Effects  No No No No 
R
2  0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 
Observations  197 197 197 197 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      Appendix A: Government Structure in Egypt 
 
Egypt has five types of local governments: governorate, markaz, city, district and village. 
There are 26 governorates headed by governors who are appointed by the president. A 
governorate, which is the main service delivery unit in Egypt, can be simple and 
completely urban (with no markaz or village) or complex, consisting of urban rural 
communities (See Figure A-1). Governorates are deconcentrated local governments 
without policymaking power over sectoral issues; they simply follow the instructions 
from the center.  
 
Markaz is the second tier local government units in complex governorates. A markaz 
consists of a capital city, as well as other cities and villages, and functions as the center 
for the jurisdiction. It is headed by a markaz chief, appointed by the prime minister. Each 
governorate has at least one city. Cities may be divided into districts. District (hay) is the 
smallest local government unit in urban governorates. Districts are divided into sections 
(subdistricts) or neighborhoods (sheyakha). City and district chiefs are appointed by the 
minister of local development. Village (qariya) is the smallest local government unit in 
rural governorates. Service responsibilities of villages vary according to the size. Larger 
villages are part of the local government system with service responsibilities. Smaller 
ones, on the other hand, called satellite villages, are not considered as local government 
units and have no service delivery responsibilities. They are part of either a village or a 
markaz (Amin and Ebel, 2006). The village chief is appointed by the governor.   
 
The Constitution and the Law 43 of 1979 require having two councils operating in each 
of the local government units: elected People’s Council (EPC) and local Executive 
Council. The members of EPC are elected by popular vote every four years. Article 162 
of the Constitution requires that half of the members be from workers and peasants. The 
members of the local Executive Council, on the other hand, is appointed by the central 
government. It is composed of the governor as the head of the council, chiefs of the 
Markaz, cities and districts as well as the heads of the directorates of central ministries.   
 
The responsibilities of EPCs include (i) supervising various utilities and activities that fall 
under the jurisdiction of the governorate with the context of the national public policy; 
(ii) requesting, through the governor, any data related to the activities of other productive 
and economic unites operating in the governorate; (iii) approving the drafts of the annual 
budget and economic and social plans; (iv) outlining and approving various plans for 
local projects requiring community efforts and resource mobilization; and (v) proposing 
new local taxes and imposing specific local fees and duties (Amin, 2005). 
 
The responsibilities of the executive council include (i) preparing the governorate budget; 
(ii) assisting the governor through preparing administrative and financial plans and 
preparing decrees to be issued by the EPC; and (iii) supervising the work of executive 
organs and assessing implementation performance of projects and service delivery at the 
governorate level (Amin, 2005). 
 
  35Although the laws empower EPCs in overseeing the budget preparation and 
implementation as well as service delivery in their jurisdictions, in reality, EPCs are less 
powerful than the appointed executive council (Amin and Ebel, 2006). They have limited 
power to play “any meaningful role in the preparation of the budgets of the jurisdictions 
they represent” (Amin and Ebel, 2006; 16).  
 
Figure A-1: Egyptian Local Government System 
 
Source: Amin, Khalid Z. and Robert D. Ebel. 2006. Intergovernmental Relations and Fiscal Decentralization: Egypt 
Public Expenditure Review. World Bank MENA Region Policy Note: 8. 
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  36Appendix B: Government Structure in Iran 
The Iranian public administration system is composed of the central government and two 
types of local government units—deconcentrated line agencies and the municipal 
authorities. The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran defines the deconcentrated local 
government units as governmental and municipalities as non-governmental units (see 
Table B-1):  
1.  Public, Governmental Sector  (Umumi, Dowlati): The “public governmental” sector 
includes the line ministries and central government agencies with offices at sub-
national levels. It consists of officials appointed by the central government. At the 
provincial level, deconcentrated service delivery is coordinated through planning 
bodies under the supervision of the Management and Planning Organization (MPO), 
the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development 
(MHUD). 
2.  Public, non-governmental sector ( Umumi Gheir-dowlati): The “public non-
governmental” sector includes urban and rural municipalities, as well as the hierarchy 
of representative directly and indirectly elected councils. It consists of the 
representative bodies which include the directly elected urban and rural local councils 
(established in 1999) and the indirectly elected hierarchy of Islamic councils 
(established in 2002 and comprising of County Islamic Councils, District Islamic 
Councils, Provincial Islamic Councils, and the High Islamic Council of Provinces) as 
well as the administrative bodies of urban and rural municipalities at the city and 
village levels. 
 
These two structures make up the sub-national administration framework in Iran. The 
first type—public, governmental Sector (Umumi, Dowlati)—is referred as the 
deconcentrated (provincial) local governments. Line ministries providing services, such 
as gas, electricity, transportation, education and health, are organized sectorally at the 
provincial level and are coordinated at all levels through the MPO and the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Finance (MEAF). The second type—public, non-governmental 
(Umumi Gheir-dowlati)—is referred as decentralized (municipal) local governments. The 
municipal sector is coordinated separately through Ministry of Interior’s Municipalities 
Organization (MO) and provides urban municipal services including public health, 
recreational services including parks, public safety including fire stations and local 
transportation including buses and taxis as well as rural municipal services.   
The subnational administration in Iran is primarily organized at the provincial level. For 
administrative purposes the country is divided into 30 provinces (ostan). The populations 
of ostans vary considerably with more than eleven million inhabitants in Tehran and 
fewer than 600,000 in the smallest ostans such as Ilam and Semnan. The ostans have 
subdivisions called districts (shahrestan). Shahrestans also have subdivisions called rural 
county (bakhsh). Ostans, shahrestans and bakhsh are deconcentrated governmental units 
and cover the whole territory of Iran.  
  37The head of osthan administration is Ostandar, who is an appointed by the central 
government. Expenditures at the osthan level are organized through line agencies and 
spending units. These units are responsible for provincial expenditures while national 
public services such as defense and those public goods with significant externalities are 
assigned to the central units.  
An important component of the subnational administration system in Iran is the local 
councils. Iran has an elaborate local council structure (Tajbakhsh, 2000). There exists a 
hierarchically nested system of directly and indirectly elected councils.
16 In addition to 
the directly elected city and village councils, there are intermediate representative 
councils at geographic and administrative levels. At the lowest level, representatives from 
a group of directly elected village councils constitute a rural county council (bakhsh). At 
the district level, representatives from rural county and urban councils within a district 
make up the members of the district council. At the ostan level, representatives from each 
district council within an ostan send representatives to the ostan level council. Finally, 
Higher Council of Provinces is comprised of one representative from each ostan council. 
However, while the councils are the only source of local legislation, and the mayor, as the 
local executive, is charged with carrying out these decisions, the areas in which the 
council can legislate and pass bills is restricted. In fact, in relation to the entire range of 
issues that impact local economic development, the council and municipality has a 
secondary or almost no role. The restricted interactions and limited role of elected 
councils constitute a major obstacle to increased inclusiveness and accountability 
(Tajbakhsh, 2000).  This weak institutionalization, in conjunction with the enhanced role 
of the MO is among the factors that exacerbate Mayor-Council tense relations, primarily 
because mayors feel increasingly dependent upon Central Government and consequently 
less accountable to the Municipal Council (Tajbakhsh, 2000). 
 
                                                 
16 The city councils have a term of four years. The size of councils varies 5 to 11 people depending on the 
population of the locality. Tehran as the capital city has 15-member council. 
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Table B-1: The System of Subnational Administration in Iran 
   A.  Deconcentrated   
System 














B. Elected Body 
(Direct or Indirect) 
Appointed 
executive-
manager by B. 
Planning Body 
National        Higher Council of 
Provinces 
  Urban Master Plans, designed 
by MOH approved by Higher 
Council of Architecture and 
City Planning (inter-sectoral 
body), implemented by MOI 








Provincial Council    Provincial Planning and 
Development Council (Chair: 
Ostandar; Secretary: MPO 
Province Office Director; Line 
Ministry reps; Higher Council 
of Provinces), responsible for 









District Council    District Planning Committee 
(Chair: Farmandar; Secretary: 
MPO District Office Director; 












   City  Council 
(Directly Elected) 
Shahrdar 
(Mayor) – jointly 
appointed by 













Source:Tajbakhsh. 2000. Appendix C: Government Structure in Tunisia 
 
Tunisia has a two tier local government system. Governorates (conseils regionaux) are 
deconcentrated units representing state administration in a region. There are 24 
governorates covering the whole territory of the country. Each governorate has a regional 
assembly headed by the governor. Governors are appointed by the central government. 
Both governorates and regional assemblies operate under the tutelage of the Ministry of 
Interior. Regional assembly is made up of deputies elected in the circumscriptions 
covered by the governorate, municipal mayors, rural councils’ presidents and other 
appointed members. Regional assemblies are charged with the management of regional 
affairs and elaboration on the regional development plans and town plans in non-
urbanized areas.  In addition, local councils of development were established by law in 
1994 to discuss issues relative to local development.  These consultative bodies are 
composed of municipalities’ and rural councils’ presidents, sectors’ chiefs, 
representatives of public institutions and representatives of exterior services of the 
administration. 
 
Regions are divided into urbanized (communalise) and non-urbanized (non communalise) 
territories. Urbanized territories, covering 63 percent of the population, are served by 
municipalities. There are 262 municipalities in urban areas and rural centers. 
Municipalities are governed by an elected municipal council that elects its mayor within 
its ranks.
17 The rural areas in non-urbanized territories are served by the deconcentrated 
units (governorates and their subdivisions). Populations in non-urbanized territories are 
often regrouped in villages (agglomerations). Villages have consultative councils used as 
sounding boards by the region, but they have no formal recognition as local governments 
(Vaillancourt and Belaid, 1998). There are 185 appointed rural councils covering a small 
portion of the geography. They are created by the Ministry of Interior in the rural areas 
where basic public service facilities (i.e. schools, health clinics) exist.  
 
                                                 
17 Municipal councilors are elected for a 5 year term by direct universal suffrage by voters living in the 
municipal area. The number of councilors varies 10 to 60 based on the population size of the area. 20 
percent of the seats are reserved for minorities.  
  40Appendix D: Government Structure in West Bank/Gaza 
 
The local government system in West Bank and Gaza (WBG) reflects the realities of 
Israeli occupation. The overriding concerns in the design of local government system 
have always been providing emergency services and security through central control. As 
a result, laws, political system, administrative arrangements and development practices of 
local governments are geared towards these objectives rather than providing services to 
local communities.  
 
Prior to the 1994 Oslo Peace Accord, in the absence of a sovereign state, Palestinian local 
governments have had to fend for themselves in providing services to local communities. 
The Ministry of Local Governments (MOLG) established in 1994 to help build an 
effective local government system. However, the current legal framework in WBG 
assigns the central government strong formal controls over local governments (World 
Bank, 2006). 
 
The Law on Local Authorities of 1997 (LLA) provides the legal basis for the current 
local government system in WBG. There are three different levels of local government 
units: 
  16 governorates, representing the central government at the regional level; 
  120 municipalities, providing public services in urban areas; 
  251 village councils, providing public services in rural areas. 
 
LLA draws heavily on other regional country legislative frameworks, particularly that of 
Jordan. LLA grants significant powers to the central government, primarily Ministry of 
Local Government in its role as the sector regulatory agency, including provisions for 
approvals of a wide range of activities of local governments and claw-back clauses where 
autonomy appears to be granted (World Bank, 2006).   
 
Governorates are deconcentrated local government units operating at the provincial level.  
There are sixteen governorates (eleven in the West Bank, five in Gaza). Governors 
appointed by the President of the Palestinian Authority head governorates. They are 
charged primarily with security and public safety functions (World Bank, 2006).  
 
Municipalities are decentralized local government units with elected mayors and council 
members. Municipalities are classified into four categories based on population 
criterion
18 as well as location and date of establishment characteristics (See Table D-1).  
 
The LLA provides the legal basis for municipal expenditure responsibilities and revenue-
raising authorities. However, a there is a significant mismatch between the legal 
assignments to municipalities and the reality on the ground (World Bank, 2006). The 
absence of an effective public administration system compels the larger municipalities 
                                                 
18 Population figured prominently as a criterion for classification when first defined in the LLA. As stated 
in the LLA, wherever a local population exceeds 5,000, there is a basis for establishing municipality. This 
basic criterion has not been applied consistently as many of the newly established municipalities have 
population less than 5,000 (World Bank, 2006).  
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assume responsibilities that are not necessarily assigned to them by law, such as fire 
fighting service and maintenance of school buildings (World Bank, 2006). 
 
Table D-1: Categorization of Local Government Units in West Bank & Gaza 
Category Number  Criteria 
Class A Municipality  14  Governorate Centers (major cities) 
Class B Municipality  24  Established before 1994 
Class C Municipality  41  Established after 1994, with a population of more than 15,000 
Class D Municipality  40  Established after 1994, with a population of between 5,000 and 15,000 
Village Councils  251  Population of less than 5,000 




The LLA grants the central government with extensive powers over municipal 
governments in terms of control over revenue sources. They have to obtain the approval 
of the central government in setting the tax rates and defining the revenue bases. Mostly 
within the confines of the centrally defined tax and fee bases, assessment strategies, and 
rates, the local governments are provided with revenue sources such as property taxes, 
building permits and utility revenues. They are also allowed to perform certain public 
functions and market services to raise additional revenues. Yet, in practice, the 
municipalities invent their own ways of raising revenues and they often find ways of 
rationalizing such practices in old laws (World Bank, 2006). Furthermore, the 
municipalities impose new taxes or fees without an explicit approval of the central 
government and they collect and administer them locally. For certain revenue items, there 
are differences in practice between West Bank and Gaza. For example, while property 
taxes are collected and administered by the central government in West Bank, in Gaza 
municipalities collect and administer property taxes themselves.   
 
  
 Appendix E: Government Structure in Yemen 
 
In Yemen, there are 22 governorates and 332 districts both of which are called 
administrative units. Each administrative unit has its own local authority, which consists 
of the administrative head of the unit (either the governor at governorate level or the 
director at the district level
19), the elected local council at both governorate and district 
levels, and the executive organs (branches office of the ministries and other government 
agencies). 
 
At the governorate level,  there are 14 areas for which the local authority has 
responsibility for funding, managing and maintaining projects. These include building, 
equipment and maintenance of technical and skilled manpower schools and centers, high 
schools for teachers, general and specialist hospitals, medical drug and equipment 
warehouses and medical laboratories, medical schools, centers for the handicapped, 
orphan and senior care, water supply dams and reservoirs, agriculture, veterinary and 
fishing institutes, agriculture and fishing natural museums, administrative buildings for 
governorates and districts, bridges and tunnels, cult concerts, museums and libraries, art 
exhibitions, youth centers and sports stadiums.  
 
At the district level, there are 22 items for which the local authority is seen as responsible 
for funding, managing and maintaining. These include religious, primary and secondary 
schools, literacy centers, children day care centers, libraries, school teaching and 
handicraft workshops, health centers, motherhood centers, family planning centers, 
primary health care centers and rural health units, social development and subsidies for 
productive families, centers for agricultural and rural extension advice, husbandry for 
domestic animals and fish, veterinarian and agricultural services, seed preparation, 
nurseries and demonstration farms, agricultural dams, irrigation systems, electricity 
networks, children playgrounds and public parks, secondary highways and roads, bridges 
and parking, services and rest areas for public transportation users, slaughterhouses, 
public markets and toilets, cemeteries and public shelters, clearing land and planting trees 
environmental projects, local water supply and sewage systems, maintaining historic 






                                                 
19 Until 2008, governors were appointed by the central government.  
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